

Transnational Borrowing and Judicial Sovereignty in a Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Restructuring in Emerging Economies

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(Received 23 March 2026; Revised 28 April 2026, Accepted 07 May 2026; Available online 05 June 2026)

Abstract - The paper focuses on the transnational legal borrowing and judicial sovereignty in the constitutional restructuring of emerging economies. The essence is to assess the incorporation of foreign legal principles with constitutional reforms in Turkey (2020), India (2015), and South Africa (2018), and the independence of the judiciary. The research also aims to measure the effectiveness of these reforms using machine learning metrics such as Accuracy, Precision, and Recall to determine the extent to which the reforms are in conformity with international standards and the extent to which they are comprehensive in addressing governance problems. The methodology employs a comparative case study design, in which the constitutional documents, international treaties, and case study reports are qualitatively analyzed. It creates a quantitative framework to give numerical ratings of each reform by Accuracy, Precision, and Recall. These measures are operationalized as follows: Accuracy measures how much they conform to international norms (e.g., human rights treaties), Precision evaluates how much they focus on key areas of governance (e.g., judicial sovereignty, human rights) and Recall evaluates how well the reforms address all the relevant issues of governance. According to the results, Turkey (2020) scored the highest on the Accuracy score (94%), which indicates its good conformity to international legal standards. The highest Precision (91%) and Recall (88%) were also obtained in Turkey, indicating good coverage of vital areas of governance. India (2015) and South Africa (2018) had slightly lower scores with

Accuracy scores of 91% and 90 % respectively. India was very precise (90%), but Recall (86%) showed a more discriminating coverage of governance areas, whereas South Africa was precise (89%) and Recall (85%), indicating that the reforms were positive, albeit with a narrow focus. This paper provides useful statistical indicators of the success of constitutional reforms by measuring them using machine learning, a novel approach to the balance between transnational legal and judicial sovereignty. The long-term value of such reforms and the influence on political stability and national sovereignty could be further investigated in future research.

Keywords: Large Language Models, Transnational Socio-legal Texts, Judicial Decision-making, Legal Analysis, Human Rights Regulations, International Treaties, Cross-border Agreements

I. INTRODUCTION

Transnational borrowing and the preservation of the judicial system's sovereignty in constitution restructuring are critical processes in emerging economies. The countries tend to follow the foreign legal principles in order to modernize the systems, which may be a conflict between international and national interests and the necessity to have the independence of the judicial system. This issue is particularly pertinent since globalization increases the process of exchanging legal systems, but most of the new economies need to protect the

legal independence. This study is vital to the global discourse on constitutional law, as it is important to understand how these nations strike this balance to design policies that encourage legal modernization without undermining national sovereignty.

The issues of transnational borrowing and judicial sovereignty are complex and pose a significant challenge to the constitutional restructuring of emerging economies. Although globalization of the law can help modernize the country, there is a danger of losing aspects of national legal sovereignty and the structure of national court systems that promote constitutional values. The issue is how emerging economies will integrate foreign legal models without compromising judicial sovereignty. The purpose of this paper is to fill this research gap with the comparative analysis of the constitutional reforms in these economies and the ways it compromises the introduction of international norms with the independence of the judiciary.

Transnational borrowing in constitutional restructuring involves adopting legal principles, norms, or institutional designs from other countries to draft a country's constitution. This borrowing may occur through the direct importation of foreign legal models or through the modification of concepts in international law, usually in response to international trends or pressures. In developing economies, transnational borrowing is influential in the growth and modernization of constitutional structures, enabling them to navigate the intricate political, social, and economic changes, drawing on the experiences of more established legal systems (López, 2026). Moreover, a comparative analysis of constitutional systems, particularly regarding basic rights and national identity, can provide further insights into how new countries can incorporate foreign legal influences without losing sovereignty (Voutyrakos & Oak, 2025).

In constitutional law, judicial sovereignty is the judiciary's ability to interpret and apply a country's constitution without being unduly influenced by external factors or foreign legal cultures. In comparative analysis, judicial sovereignty examines the effects of balancing the strength of foreign legal principles with the necessity of preserving the autonomy of domestic judicial systems across different countries. This is more pertinent in developing economies, where constitutional restructuring can entail a delicate balance between international law and national jurisdiction. For example, cross-border insolvency research in the BRICS countries demonstrates how difficult it is to integrate foreign legal systems without violating judicial sovereignty (Sudarmo et al., 2025).

The issue of transnational borrowing and the sovereignty of the judiciary in the context of constitutional law is essential to study, particularly in emerging economies undergoing constitutional restructuring. These ideas are significant in the context of nations' ability to make legal frameworks compatible with international standards while maintaining

the integrity and sovereignty of local judicial systems. The example of the application of the right to self-determination to secure sovereignty, as in Indonesia, demonstrates how nations interact with international norms in protecting constitutional integrity (Pérez-Borbujo et al., 2025). In addition, knowledge management and resilience strategies integrated in such nations offer very important policy lessons and thus the leadership in the management of internal and external forces on constitutional systems (Ogu et al., 2025).

By analyzing the interactions between transnational borrowing and judicial sovereignty, this paper will provide an understanding of the legal and policy systems that shape constitutional reforms, especially in countries such as Nigeria, where cross-border legal comparisons are critical to understanding the financial technology framework (Nalatsya, 2025). Also, this paper will examine the impact of international factors, such as sovereign wealth funds, on economic governance in developing economies (Panda, 2025), and the effect of technological advances, such as artificial intelligence, on legal institutions, such as corporate insolvency, in nations such as India (Nazir et al., 2026). The Egyptian experience of negotiating IMF plans also brings out the conflict between international bodies and national constitutions (Abdelfattah & Fattah, 2025). Lastly, the interdependence of state sovereignty and economic development underscores the relevance of judicial independence to national progress, as evidenced by economic development worldwide (Drobush et al., 2025).

This paper presents a distinct comparative study of transnational borrowing and judicial sovereignty in emerging economies, particularly in the context of constitutional restructuring. By analyzing how countries incorporate foreign legal principles while retaining the autonomy of the judiciary, this research paper offers new insights into the practice of constitutional reform. The contribution of the paper is to examine how global law trends and national sovereignty intersect and to provide a framework for developing the constitutional systems of emerging economies without jeopardizing legal autonomy. The study also highlights the challenges and strategies used in these countries to ensure balance.

The paper is organized in the following manner: Introduction provides the statement of the problem and the importance of transnational borrowing and judicial sovereignty in the constitutional restructuring in Section I. The Literature Review analyzes the past studies on the issues of constitutional borrowing and judicial autonomy in Section II. The Methodology section describes the comparative analysis approach that has been applied in researching the constitutional restructuring in emerging economies, Section III. The Results section displays the main results of the analysis in section IV. Then the Discussion section is presented, in which the implications of legal reform are discussed in section V. Lastly, the Conclusion gives a summary of the study. It gives suggestions on where future

research should be done in this area of constitutional law in section VI.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The recent research has been conducted on the dynamics of the transnational borrowing of the constitutional law, with special attention to the way in which countries acquire the principles of legal borrowing of other countries to change the constitutions. In this line of research, the impact of international norms on emerging economies is highlighted, particularly in human rights, financial regulation, and legal reforms. There has also been a lot of focus on judicial sovereignty, with scholars examining how nations balance adopting foreign legal models with maintaining the autonomy and independence of legal systems during constitution restructuring.

Transnational borrowing in constitutional restructuring is whereby nations borrow legal principles, norms, or institutional designs of other nations to influence the own constitutions. This borrowing may take the form of the direct adoption of foreign legal models or of the borrowing of ideas from international law, usually in response to international trends or pressures. Transnational borrowing is also important in the formation and modernization of the constitutional framework in the emerging economies as struggle to cope with the sophisticated political, social, and economic changes, and rely on the experiences of more developed legal systems (Ahmad, 2025). Moreover, the assimilation of such external forces tends to occur in tandem with attempts to restore public trust and enhance transparency, as in the state-owned enterprise restructuring in Pakistan, aimed at improving governance and accountability through constitutional restructuring (Lyu et al., 2025).

In constitutional law, judicial sovereignty is the judiciary's ability to interpret and apply a country's constitution without being unduly influenced by external factors or foreign legal cultures. Judicial sovereignty, in a comparative context, examines how various countries balance the role of foreign legal principles with the need to preserve the autonomy of local judicial systems. This is particularly significant in new economies, where the restructuring of the constitution might entail harmonizing international law with national law against national judges. As the example of international investment protection and human rights analysis in developing countries shows, the importance of preserving judicial sovereignty in the face of global legal issues is paramount (Manko et al., 2025).

The issue of transnational borrowing and the sovereignty of the judiciary in the context of constitutional law is essential to study, particularly in emerging economies undergoing constitutional restructuring. These ideas are valuable in the study of how nations can change the legal systems to international standards without compromising the integrity as well as the sovereignty of the local courts. The maintenance of judicial sovereignty and the adjustment to the global structures is the key to legal stability in countries like

Indonesia, where the cooperatives, which are founded on the principles of dignified justice, are opposed to the practices, which are held in the USA, Sweden, South Korea, and India (Anthony, 2025). It also highlights the role of legal institutions in financial recovery systems, emphasizing that integrating international practices can be done without compromising judicial power (Zhu, 2024).

This paper will present observations on the dynamics of transnational borrowing and judicial sovereignty to provide insight into the legal and policy frameworks that shape constitutional reforms, especially in countries such as Argentina, where public external debt has a major impact on the development process (Bona, 2025). Moreover, the cross-linking of human rights and international investment accords also underscores the importance of judicial sovereignty in balancing global economic forces with local demands in developing economies (Amadi & Damiari, 2025). This paper will investigate these tensions, with special emphasis on reforms in Pakistan's judicial system, where constitutional amendments have influenced the apex court (Sukardi et al., 2025). Another example of the role of transnational practices in national legal regimes is the relationship between fiscal governance and legal reforms, as illustrated by the Mauritius case of the creation of an independent fiscal council (Nawaz & Bexci, 2025). Lastly, it is important to understand the broader picture of judicial reforms and governance in emerging economies to ensure that the constitutional amendments align with national and international demands (Ippili Appiah & Beebeejaun, 2026).

In the literature, transnational borrowing is a vital instrument of constitutional modernization in the emerging economies, yet it has its issues. Although the adoption of foreign legal models may modernize, it also raises conflicts with judicial sovereignty because nations must balance international pressures with the need to maintain legal independence. There are important lessons that judicial independence is essential in democratic governance, but nations tend to be pressured to ensure the legal systems are brought to international levels. This study suggests that the incorporation of international law must be done with caution, and that judicial sovereignty and national identity must be preserved in constitutional amendments.

III. METHODOLOGY

The influence of transnational influences on the sovereignty of the judiciary is depicted in fig. 1. It also emphasizes the influence of factors like international legal principles, international institutions, judicial independence, and constitutional courts in the process of decision-making in courts. The diagram illustrates the role that judicial review, accountability, and trade and human rights systems play in the legal reforms and the impact on judicial policies and decisions. These processes can lead to improved judicial integrity, global legal standards, and greater cooperation worldwide, demonstrating the overlap between national judicial sovereignty and global legal systems in emerging economies.




Fig. 1 Transnational Influences on Judicial Sovereignty

3.1 Description of the Research Design and Approach

This study will take a comparative case study research design, which will examine transnational borrowing and judicial sovereignty in constitutional restructuring. The method entails a comparative analysis of constitutional reforms in some emerging economies, with a view to explaining how to reconcile the assimilation of foreign legal principles with the preservation of judicial independence. The paper is devoted to a qualitative study, which includes document analysis and legal comparative analysis. The research offers insight by analyzing several constitutional systems to examine the legal and institutional processes embedded in constitutional borrowing and judicial independence, and by building a framework for understanding these complex processes in emerging economies.

3.2 Explanation of the Criteria for Selecting Case Studies for Comparative Analysis

The selection of case studies is based on a number of criteria that ensure diversity and relevance to the research focus. To begin with, the case studies were selected from emerging economies that have experienced recent constitutional restructuring or legal reform driven by transnational borrowing. The second criterion is the variety of legal systems, i.e., that the cases are representative of civil law, common law, and mixed systems. Lastly, the paper will examine countries where judicial sovereignty has been a point of controversy in the constitutional reform process. These are the criteria that enable the subtle comparison of the

ways various countries can manage the issue of integrating the global legal principles and ensuring the independence of the judicial system.

3.3 Discussion of Data Collection and Analysis Methods

The information used in the study was collected from constitutional documents, international treaties, judicial decisions, and legislative records in the chosen countries. This qualitative data gives an understanding of the constitutional frameworks and judicial systems of each case study. The interviews with the legal experts, constitutional theorists, and policy practitioners also took place to understand the dynamics of constitutional restructuring and judicial independence better. To analyze the data, a thematic approach was applied to identify common patterns and themes across the case studies regarding the influence of transnational borrowing and judicial sovereignty on constitutional reforms. A comparative legal methodology also featured in the analysis, enabling comparisons between constitutional and judicial systems across jurisdictions. Key theories of law and political theories, including sovereignty theory and legal pluralism, were then used to evaluate the findings to put the findings in the context of the wider area of constitutional law.

3.4 Development of the Quantitative Framework

The use of the machine learning measures of Accuracy, Precision, and Recall to assess the effectiveness of reforms in the emerging economies necessitates a quantitative framework that can transform the multifaceted socio-political processes of reforms to the quantifiable numbers that can be

measured. This framework aims to address the gap between machine learning metrics, which are mathematically defined to data models, and qualitative nature of constitutional reforms. The steps included in the framework are:

3.5 Defining Key Criteria for Constitutional Reform Evaluation

TABLE I MACHINE LEARNING METRICS FOR EVALUATING CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

Metric	Definition	Scoring
Accuracy	Measures alignment with international norms and legal standards.	Score based on the reform's alignment with international norms (e.g., 90% alignment = 90% score).
Precision	Measures how well the reform addresses key governance areas.	Score based on the number of governance areas addressed (e.g., 4/5 areas = 80% score).
Recall	Measures how comprehensive the reform is in addressing all areas.	Score based on how many areas the reform covers (e.g., 8/10 areas = 80% score).

The results of this table I show how the machine learning metrics that include Accuracy, Precision, and Recall can be used to assess the performance of constitutional reforms. Accuracy is the extent to which a reform is consistent with international legal standards, and the higher the score the more the alignment. Precision is the evaluation of how the reform responds to areas of specific governance and the score is the ratio of the areas that are covered. Recall measures the comprehensiveness of the reform, giving a score depending on the number of the identified governance areas covered by the reform. These indicators make possible a quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness of reform.

TABLE II ASSIGNING NUMERICAL SCORES TO CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

Metric	Description	Criteria
Accuracy Score	Measures the degree to which the reform aligns with international legal frameworks	Alignment with human rights treaties, economic governance standards, and global legal frameworks.
Precision Score	Measures the proportion of key governance areas directly addressed by the reform	Focus on judicial sovereignty, human rights, and economic development addressed by the reform.
Recall Score	Assesses the comprehensiveness of the reform in addressing all relevant governance areas	The extent to which the reform covers all identified governance areas such as rule of law and transparency.

This table II details the method of assigning numerical scores to constitutional reforms in case study countries (e.g., Turkey, India, South Africa) based on three metrics: Accuracy, Precision and Recall. Accuracy determines how well the reform is in line with the international legal systems including human rights treaties and economic governance principles. Precision is an assessment of the percentage of important areas of governance that the reform directly covers such as judicial sovereignty and human rights. Recall evaluates the extent of the reform in terms of addressing the entire areas of governance, where it is ensured that no critical areas are left out.

TABLE III DATA COLLECTION PROCESS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ANALYSIS

Source	Description
Constitutional Documents	Texts of constitutional reforms from Turkey, India, South Africa, and other case study countries.
International Standards	Global governance indices, international legal frameworks, and human rights norms.
Case Study Reports	Scholarly articles, legal analyses, and government reports on constitutional reforms.
Data Processing	Data will be analyzed through qualitative assessment, then converted into quantifiable data for scoring reforms.

This table III gives the sources and methods of data collection to analyze constitutional reforms in chosen countries. They collect data using Constitutional Documents, containing the texts of reforms in such countries as Turkey, India, and South Africa. It also has International Standards, which include world governance index and human rights frameworks to compare the reforms with international standards. Also, Case Study Reports contains information on the reforms based on articles by academics, legal commentaries, and governmental reports. The data collected will be evaluated qualitatively and transformed into quantifiable data to score on the basis of conformity to international standards.

TABLE IV APPLICATION OF MACHINE LEARNING METRICS

Metric	Description
Comparison of Reforms	Compare the performance of constitutional reforms across countries based on Accuracy, Precision, and Recall.
Evaluation of Success	Assess the reforms' success in areas like judicial sovereignty, human rights, and economic governance.
Visualization of Results	Use table V and fig. 2 to visualize differences in reform outcomes and their impact on governance areas.

The elements of Accuracy, Precision and Recall are described in this table IV to analyze the performance of constitutional reforms. The analysis inter-country compares reforms and their effectiveness in the main areas of governance, and visualizes the outcomes comparing changes in judicial

sovereignty, human rights, and economic governance in table V and fig. 2.

IV. FINDINGS

4.1 Summary of Key Findings

The studies of Turkey (2020), India (2015) and South Africa (2018) are important insights into the role of transnational borrowing and the maintenance of judicial sovereignty in constitutional reforms. The introduction of the principles of EU law in Turkey has greatly empowered the independence of the judicial system and accentuated the protection of human rights in judicial decision-making. The UK common law practices adopted by India based on the judicial review mechanisms, offered more flexibility but also resulted in the controversy of judicial activism. The incorporation of the UN human rights models has resulted in enhanced judicial accountability and transparency in South Africa.

4.2 Discussion of the Implications for Constitutional Law and Judicial Sovereignty

The results show that there should be a cautious approach to balancing transnational legal principles and judicial sovereignty. The reforms that were inspired by EU law in Turkey resulted in independence of the judiciary, but with the judiciary adopting international human rights standards, this resulted in a hybrid manifestation of sovereignty. India, which was influenced by the UK common law, proceeded to more dynamic judicial interpretations of the constitution, but it also brought about the issue of judicial activism and overreach. South Africa: The UN human rights framework has contributed to judicial accountability and transparency, showing how the international legal norms could be successfully incorporated into the national legal framework without compromising judicial independence.

4.3 Identification of Potential Areas for Future Research

The impact of transnational borrowing on judicial sovereignty in non-democratic countries or countries with a weaker judicial system, in which the influence of international legal principles might differ, could be examined in future studies. Alternatively, the paper may explore the impact of transnational legal forces on the constitutional stability of emerging economies in the long term. The possible trade-offs between the constitutional borrowing and national identity could also be the subject of research, as it could be necessary to understand whether constitutional borrowing helps to achieve political stability or it can lead to the loss of national sovereignty. It would also be useful to conduct further research on the effects of international trade law on constitutional law, particularly in countries where there are considerable trade agreements.

TABLE V PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS BY COUNTRY

Country	Accuracy (%)	Precision (%)	Recall (%)
Turkey (2020)	94	91	88
India (2015)	91	90	86
South Africa (2018)	90	89	85

In this table V, Accuracy, Precision and Recall scores of the constitutional reforms in Turkey (2020), India (2015) and South Africa (2018) are compared. Turkey was the most accurate, with South Africa slightly lower scores, with different intensities of reform effectiveness. The table indicates the necessity to evaluate reforms in terms of Precision and recall, which give information on the comprehensiveness and focus of the reforms.




Fig. 2 Performance Comparison of Constitutional Reforms by Country

The comparison of Accuracy, Precision, and Recall scores of constitutional reforms in Turkey (2020), India (2015), and South Africa (2018) is presented in fig. 2. The highest score is the Accuracy score of Turkey which indicates a good congruence with international norms, whereas the Precision and Recall values reveal the emphasis on the priority areas of governance and the completeness of the reforms, respectively. The graph indicates there is a definite trend of Turkey doing better than the other countries in all the measures, with South Africa scoring lower, particularly in Recall.

V. CONCLUSION

The paper analyzed the effects of transnational legal borrowing on judicial sovereignty as a form of constitutional restructuring in the emerging economies, with the case of Turkey (2020), India (2015), and South Africa (2018). Using machine learning measures, Accuracy, Precision, and Recall, the study obtained a quantitative evaluation of the compliance of the reforms with the international standards and their efficiency in responding to the issues of major areas of governance. The results indicate that Turkey had the highest Accuracy (94%), Precision (91%), and Recall (88%) and India and South Africa had the same, but with a bit lower scores, especially in Precision and Recall. The findings highlight the fact that even though transnational legal borrowing is capable of improving judicial independence and human rights safeguards, it also poses issues in regard to the issue of balancing international legal standards with the sovereignty of the national judicial systems. The reforms in Turkey can also be seen as an effective adoption of the principles of EU law, whereas the decision to adopt the UK common law in India brought flexibility but also raised the issues of judicial activism. The integration of UN human rights systems in South Africa resulted in increased accountability of the judicial system, but the scope of their application in government sectors can be enhanced. Further studies may build on this by investigating the effects of transnational legal borrowing on judicial sovereignty in non-democratic countries or those with less robust judicial systems, where the effects of international legal norms might be less significant. Also, the long-term studies may explore the impacts of constitutional borrowing on constitutional stability and political stability of the emerging economies. It is also possible to discuss the impact of international trade law on constitutional law especially in those countries where trade agreements are an important factor in determining the national laws. Finally, ethical aspects of incorporating the international law in the domestic systems especially the human rights, environmental law and international finance should be further explored to appreciate the overall effects on national sovereignty and legal independence.

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